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Ha Noi’s urban redevelopment: Decentralization must go hand in hand with oversight

The Law on Capital 2026 and Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND of the Ha Noi People’s Council introduce new mechanisms, creating greater scope for urban renovation, upgrading and redevelopment.

A reporter from the Ha Noi Press, Radio and Television Authority spoke with Mr. Nguyen Hung Quang, Managing Partner of NHQuang&Associates and President of the Vietnam International Commercial Mediation Centre (VICMC), about these new mechanisms and the need to ensure publicity, transparency, accountability and oversight throughout their implementation.

Expanded authority to address bottlenecks in urban redevelopment

With the new powers provided for under the Law on Capital 2026, how much greater autonomy does Ha Noi have in deciding policies and criteria for urban renovation, upgrading and redevelopment? Which bottlenecks in project implementation could these changes help address?

The Law on Capital 2026 grants Ha Noi 199 special powers, comprising 127 powers vested in the City People’s Council, 56 in the City People’s Committee and 16 in the Chairperson of the City People’s Committee.

With regard to urban renovation, upgrading and redevelopment, Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND of the City People’s Council, issued on June 15, 2026 to implement points a, b and c of Clause 2, Article 12 of the Law on Capital 2026 and effective from July 1, 2026 (the “Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND”), introduces several notable mechanisms.

Regarding the criteria, Article 4 of Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND identifies areas with dangerous or deteriorating structures; buildings whose spacing or structural conditions fail to meet construction and fire safety standards; facilities required to be relocated; areas lacking technical or social infrastructure for residential units, or having a population exceeding the prescribed standards; areas inconsistent with the planning scheme; and areas containing structures of heritage or other value that need to be protected.

Article 11 of the Resolution provides that a compensation and resettlement plan may be approved if it receives the consent of at least 51% of homeowners and land users, subject to certification by the commune-level People’s Committee. Each apartment or land plot counts as one vote. The consultation period must not exceed 12 months and may be extended by no more than six months in cases of force majeure.

Where homeowners and land users themselves propose an investor to implement a project, the compensation, support, resettlement and temporary accommodation arrangements, including the K coefficient, are to be agreed upon by the investor and the homeowners and land users. For apartment buildings, homeowners are entitled to compensation based on a K coefficient agreed upon between the investor undertaking the renovation or reconstruction of the apartment building and the homeowners, provided that the coefficient does not exceed 2.0 times the lawful usable area of the apartment. If no agreement can be reached, a coefficient of 1.0 applies to apartments from the second floor upwards, while a coefficient of 1.2 applies to apartments on the first floor. The investor’s maximum prescribed profit margin is 15%.

The Resolution also provides for sanctions against investors who delay project implementation. Under Articles 12 and 13, the Chairperson of the City People’s Committee may revoke the decision appointing the investor, and the investor will not be reimbursed for any costs already incurred. The City will then recover the land for project implementation using public investment capital or through an auction.

Regarding temporary accommodation, the City will provide support covering 100% of rental costs for a maximum period of three years, and 50% in the fourth and fifth years. Regarding building inspections, the most recent inspection results may be reused without any time limit. Where an entire area is inspected, only representative buildings showing signs of falling within the category requiring demolition need to be inspected.

In addition, Article 15 of the Resolution provides for multi-purpose urban areas, under which the City will establish a housing fund comprising social housing, resettlement housing, official-duty housing and commercial housing to serve urban renovation. The People’s Committee may adjust land-use and housing structures, as well as planning indicators.

For urban renovation and upgrading projects for which investor selection procedures have already been carried out, implementation will continue in accordance with the regulations in force before Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND took effect on July 1, 2026. Projects for which detailed planning tasks are being prepared or have not yet been approved must suspend implementation. The City People’s Committee is required to assess and report annually to the City People’s Council on the implementation results of the Resolution. The City People’s Council and the Vietnam Fatherland Front are responsible for overseeing its implementation.

As the City’s autonomy is expanded, how should the accountability of implementing authorities be established to ensure that urban redevelopment decisions comply with the law, are transparent and are supported by clear grounds?

The Law on Capital 2026 establishes requirements for ensuring publicity, transparency, accountability and the control of power. It also provides mechanisms for monitoring, inspection and adjustment of the decentralization of powers where implementation is ineffective, as prescribed in Clause 4, Article 4 of the Law.

Before issuing a document containing provisions that differ from those of the central authorities, a city-level authority must assess the necessity of doing so, identify the objectives and expected outcomes, clearly specify the oversight mechanisms and accountability arrangements, conduct a policy impact assessment, consult the central authorities and affected stakeholders, and publicly disclose how comments have been addressed and explanations provided. The simplified procedure must not be applied. These requirements are set out in Clause 3, Article 8 of the Law on Capital 2026 and further specified in Resolution No. 05/2026/NQ-HDND, which provides for certain matters relating to the formulation and promulgation of legal normative documents for the implementation of the Law on Capital 2026.

Chapter VIII, comprising Articles 31 to 34 of the Law on Capital 2026, provides for oversight, inspection and accountability. Accordingly, the National Assembly and its Committees oversee the implementation of special mechanisms, while the Government organizes monitoring, inspection and examination activities to ensure that the decentralization of powers is implemented consistently and in compliance with the law.

The City government must ensure publicity and transparency and strengthen accountability in relation to the use of land funds, investment projects and administrative procedures, so that the public can be informed, provide comments and exercise oversight. Explanations provided in the discharge of accountability obligations must be made public. The Law also provides for strict handling of acts of corruption, profiteering and harassment, while excluding legal liability for individuals who have not acted for personal gain and have complied with their authority, procedures and formalities, but nevertheless cause damage, as prescribed by law.

For delayed projects, Clause 6, Article 22 of the Law on Capital 2026 allows the City People’s Council to introduce special measures subject to strict conditions. These include the requirement for an inspection conclusion or court judgment; classification of projects according to the causes of delay; full public disclosure of relevant information and handling decisions; and reporting to the Government or the Standing Committee of the National Assembly before December 31 each year. Such measures must not be used to legitimise violations.

In addition, Resolution No. 66/2025/NQ-HDND requires the City People’s Committee to publicly announce the areas requiring renovation, together with their boundaries and proposed planning indicators; disclose TOD data, project lists, investors’ obligations and implementation schedules; and report implementation results to the City People’s Council annually. The City People’s Council and the Vietnam Fatherland Front are responsible for oversight. Investor appointment procedures involve an inter-agency evaluation team to appraise the relevant dossiers. Planning indicators exceeding applicable standards must undergo independent appraisal and impact assessments covering transport, infrastructure, social and environmental aspects.

In my view, Ha Noi should promulgate regulations on public disclosure of project dossiers or establish a dedicated public information system for urban upgrading and redevelopment projects. This would enable residents to access, inspect and oversee such projects in accordance with the rights provided for under the Law on Capital 2026 and relevant legal regulations.

Oversight must be linked to outcomes and individual accountability

In your opinion, what oversight mechanisms are needed to ensure that the newly granted powers not only facilitate project implementation but also remain closely linked to the accountability of management authorities throughout the implementation process?

The guiding principle should be that each power granted to the City under the Law on Capital 2026 must be accompanied by a specific oversight measure. Decision-makers must remain accountable until the project delivers its intended outcomes, rather than only until the project is approved.

The Law on Capital 2026 and Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND already provide a range of tools for this purpose.

First, there should be a multi-tier oversight mechanism involving the National Assembly, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the Council for Ethnic Affairs, the Committees of the National Assembly, the Government and ministries. The Government is responsible for organising monitoring, inspection and examination of the implementation of the Law to ensure that the decentralization of powers is carried out consistently and in compliance with the law.

Second, oversight should cover the decentralization of powers itself. The Law requires mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation and inspection, as well as timely adjustment of the scope of decentralised powers where the authorities receiving such powers fail to exercise them effectively, pursuant to Clause 4, Article 4 of the Law on Capital 2026.

If the City government wishes to apply a pilot mechanism, the City People’s Committee must report annually and evaluate the results, and suspend the pilot if its negative impacts exceed the anticipated level, pursuant to Clause 5, Article 9 of the Law on Capital 2026.

Third, on-site oversight should be conducted in accordance with Resolution No. 66. The City People’s Committee must assess and report to the City People’s Council annually, and promptly consolidate implementation difficulties and obstacles so that the City People’s Council can amend or replace the Resolution. People’s Councils at all levels and the Vietnam Fatherland Front are responsible for overseeing its implementation. Revenue generated from TOD development must be publicly disclosed, separately accounted for and subject to oversight by the City People’s Council.

Fourth, there should be sanctions and mechanisms for exemption from liability. The Law provides for strict handling of acts of corruption, profiteering and harassment, while exemption from liability is available only to individuals who have not acted for personal gain and have complied with the prescribed authority, procedures and formalities, in accordance with Article 34. This requires the relevant dossiers to provide evidence of the implementation process, thereby underscoring the need for decision-makers to maintain complete records.

For these mechanisms to operate effectively, four principles should be taken into account when designing the oversight framework.

First, separate the roles of implementation, appraisal and oversight. Under Resolution No. 66/2026/NQ-HDND, the Department of Construction is responsible for leading the preparation of the project list, inviting investors and concurrently serving as the standing body of the inter-agency evaluation team that proposes the appointment of investors. Concentrating multiple roles in a single agency may facilitate implementation progress but reduces the capacity for independent self-monitoring. Another body, such as the Department of Justice, an inspection authority or an independent appraisal council, should be assigned responsibility for verification and oversight.

Second, oversight must be based on substantive data. A publicly accessible set of indicators should be established, covering the proportion of projects completed on schedule, the number of complaints, the rate of on-site resettlement, social infrastructure indicators before and after renovation, and the increase in land value compared with the investor’s profit. The authorities subject to oversight must provide written responses within a specified time limit.

Third, oversight must lead to consequences and be based on results. Laws governing the oversight activities of the National Assembly and the City People’s Councils require the heads of agencies subject to oversight to report and provide explanations directly, while oversight bodies must take responsibility for their conclusions. Accordingly, triggering thresholds should be established. For example, a project should be suspended for review when the number of complaints exceeds a specified proportion or when implementation is delayed beyond a specified period, in the spirit of Clause 4, Article 4 and Clause 5, Article 9 of the Law on Capital 2026.

Fourth, outcomes must be linked to individual accountability. The individuals responsible for each procedure must be clearly identified, including the person approving the list of urban renovation and upgrading projects, the person certifying the results of the consultation process and the person signing the decision appointing the investor. Implementation outcomes should also be incorporated into personnel performance evaluations. This is consistent with the “six clear” principle: “clear persons, clear tasks, clear responsibilities, clear timelines, clear deliverables and clear effectiveness”.

Thank you so much.

By Lai Tan, posted on Hanoimoi Newspaper on October 30, 2026.

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